



On The CIA and Related Agencies

INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY REMAINS A PROBLEM FOR CONGRESS

The Nov. 1-2 coup in Viet Nam, which deposed the regime of President Ngo Dinh Diem after nine years' rule, resulted in part at least from the U.S. Government's dissatisfaction with the Diem regime and its encouragement of reform in Viet Nam. The event focused attention on the possibility of more direct American intervention to effect the coup, and concern inevitably centered on the role of the Central Intelligence Agency.

The CIA is the fact and symbol of a postwar development in the nation which runs contrary to U.S. traditions of open diplomacy and non-intervention -- the practice of espionage and subversion to further national aims and protect national security. Actually, while the CIA has its spies and agents, much of its work of intelligence involves routine gathering and analysis of statistical, political and other data.

Criticism of CIA and other intelligence operations in the Government stems from revulsion against the cloak-and-dagger image, as well as annoyance at the intense secrecy which surrounds the intelligence community. Some fear the tradition of Democratic control of the Government, especially the military, may be undermined by the growth of para-military organs insulated from the public.

In addition, the very term "intelligence," while it attracts eager and able college graduates, implies mental faculties in the participants which critics say are not necessarily present.

Congress is particularly wary of the secrecy which covers the estimated \$1 billion-a-year operations of the CIA and other intelligence agencies in the Government. Indeed, Congress, jealous of its role as keeper of the purse strings, rankles at not even knowing how much and where the money goes for intelligence operations. Furthermore, the Congressional role of "oversight" is frustrated when it comes to supervision of the far-flung CIA operations, which probably involve between 15,000 and 20,000 employees in the U.S. and abroad.

Funds for CIA are hidden in annual appropriations for other agencies. Congress exercises only limited supervision through subcommittees of the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees.

Every year for the last ten, proposals have been made in Congress for some form of "Joint Committee on Foreign Intelligence" to give Congressional surveillance over the intelligence community in much the same manner as the Joint Atomic Energy Committee surveys the Atomic Energy Commission's activities and other nuclear affairs.

The idea of a Joint Committee on Foreign Intelligence has little chance of fulfillment in the near future, mainly because of the powerful forces in opposition to it. These are led by the President and his Administration, including the CIA, and importantly backed by the three committees in Congress which presently handle CIA matters or money -- the six-man Senate subcommittee made up of members of the Senate Armed Services and Appropriations Committees, the House Armed Services

Central Intelligence Agency Subcommittee and the House Appropriations Subcommittee on funds for intelligence activities (which itself is secret as to number and identity of members). Members of these subcommittees claim that they already provide the necessary Congressional surveillance of the intelligence community and that a joint committee for that purpose is unnecessary.

Background

The secretive, conspiratorial and subversive nature of the Communist threat to Western security led to a major expansion of U.S. intelligence operations in the postwar era. Agencies responsible for ferreting out accurate information on Communist intentions and capabilities -- and for thwarting enemy agents -- included the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the military intelligence services of the armed forces, the Department of State, the Atomic Energy Commission, the National Security Agency and the Central Intelligence Agency. Collectively, their intelligence operations -- almost totally clothed in secrecy -- cost more than \$1 billion annually, according to informed estimates.

At the center of this intelligence community is the CIA, created by the National Security Act of 1947. It is the successor of the National Intelligence Authority, established by President Truman in 1946. Responsible to the National Security Council, CIA was given broad authority to coordinate the intelligence output of the Government and to engage in undercover operations like those of the wartime Office of Strategic Services. In 1949, Congress gave complete discretionary power over CIA personnel and funds to the Director of Central Intelligence -- a post occupied successively by Rear Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter (1947-50), Gen. Walter Bedell Smith (1950-53), Allen W. Dulles (1953-61), and John A. McCone (1961-).

Little concerning CIA operations, whether successful or not, ever came to public attention. The agency was blamed in some quarters for the failure to give advance warning of the attack on South Korea in 1950 or of Chinese intervention that fall. Later CIA was credited with a hand in supplying Chinese Nationalist troops in Burma in 1950-54; in bringing down Iran's Premier Mossadegh in 1953 and the Arbenz regime in Guatemala in 1954; and in supporting the right-wing Nosavan regime in Laos in 1960. CIA's most spectacular success came to light as the result of a sensational failure: the shooting down of Francis Gary Powers in mid-Russia in May 1960 apparently put an end to four years of aerial reconnaissance over the U.S.S.R. by high-flying U-2s. CIA's most publicized failure came in April 1961 when Fidel Castro crushed an Agency-organized invasion of Cuba by rebel forces at the Bay of Pigs.

The CIA role in Viet Nam, at first in support of the Diem regime, was emphasized Oct. 4 with the recall of the CIA chief there, John H. Richardson, reportedly at

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U.S. Intelligence Complex Involves Many Agencies

Several partially interrelated groups are involved in the Government's intelligence activities:

National Security Council. Created by the National Security Act of 1947. Consists of the President, Vice President, Secretaries of State and Defense, Director of the Office of Emergency Planning (Edward A. McDermott), and such other Secretaries and Under Secretaries as the President may appoint with the consent of the Senate. Officials of the Council are Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs McGeorge Bundy, his deputy, Carl Kay-sen, and the Executive Secretary, Bromley Smith. The Director of Central Intelligence (John A. McCone) and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor) are statutory advisory members of the Council.

The Council directs the Central Intelligence Agency, headed by the Director of Central Intelligence.

The Council's duties are to "assess and appraise the objectives, commitments and risks of the United States in relation to its actual and potential military power" and consider matters concerning other agencies of the Government involved with national security.

Central Intelligence Agency. Established under the National Security Act of 1947, the Director (John A. McCone) and Deputy Director (Lt. Gen. Marshall S. Carter) are appointed by the President with the consent of the Senate. By far the largest intelligence body in the Government (with an estimated 15-20 thousand employees, half of them in the new \$50-million CIA building in Langley, Va.), the CIA is responsible to the National Security Council. It is charged with collecting and evaluating intelligence relating to national security. Although it is not responsible for making national security policy (a function of the NSC), many of CIA's critics accuse it of doing so.

U.S. Intelligence Board. Consists of the directors of the other U.S. intelligence bodies. This is considered an "operative" body, as opposed to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (below), which is "advisory." USIB provides for an exchange and coordination of information and data. John A. McCone of CIA, acting as the President's representative, is chairman of USIB. Members include: Lt. Gen. Marshall S. Carter, McCone's deputy; Lt. Gen. Joseph F. Carroll, Director of DIA; Lt. Gen. Gordon A. Blake, Director of NSA; Harry S. Traynor, Assistant General Manager for Administration of AEC; Thomas L. Hughes, Director of Intelligence and Research of the State Department; Alan H. Belmont, Assistant to the Director of the FBI; Maj. Gen. Alva R. Fitch, Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence of the Army; Rear Adm. Rufus L. Taylor, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence); and Brig. Gen. Jack E. Thomas, Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF. Executive Secretary of the USIB is James S. Lay Jr., whose office is in the CIA.

Board of National Estimates. In CIA, a small number of experts who prepare national intelligence estimates from information supplied by the other parts of the intelligence community, for submission to USIB. BNE can initiate preparation of an estimate. Staff studies are collated by a small Office of National Estimates.

President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. Established by Executive Order 10938 of May 4, 1961, "to advise the President with respect to the objectives and conduct of the foreign intelligence and related activities of the U.S." It is a "watchdog" group of citizens appointed by the President to conduct a "continuing review" of the CIA and other intelligence agencies. The executive secretary of the Board, J. Patrick Coyne, Nov. 5 told CQ the Board meets "frequently." His staff consists of four persons. Members of the Board: Clark Clifford, Washington attorney, chairman; Dr. William O. Baker, vice president of Bell Telephone of New Jersey; Lt. Gen. James Doolittle, U.S.A.F. ret., Santa Monica, Calif.; Gordon Gray, former Secretary of the Army, Washington; Dr. Edwin H. Land, president of Polaroid, Cambridge Mass.; Dr. William L. Langer, Department of History, Harvard University; Robert D. Murphy, Corning Glass International, New York, former Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs; Frank Pace Jr., Greenwich, Conn., former Secretary of the Army.

Defense Intelligence Agency. Created by the Secretary of Defense Aug. 1, 1961, to supervise and coordinate the intelligence functions of the Department and those of the military departments. Viewed as a potential rival to CIA. Director: Air Force Lt. Gen. Joseph F. Carroll; Deputy Director, Army Lt. Gen. William W. Quinn; Chief of Staff, Navy Rear Admiral Samuel B. Frankel.

National Security Agency. Created by Presidential directive in 1952 as a part of the Defense Department, with headquarters at Fort Meade, Md. It performs "highly specialized technical and coordinating functions relating to the national security," particularly coding and decoding activities. In recent years, NSA has been the focal point of the principal spy and defection incidents in the intelligence community. Director: Air Force Lt. Gen. Gordon A. Blake; Deputy Director, Dr. Louis W. Tordella.

Atomic Energy Commission. Intelligence activities of the AEC are directed by the Division of Intelligence (Dr. C.H. Reichardt, Director) under the Assistant General Manager for Administration (Harry S. Traynor), who is a member of the USIB.

State Department. Intelligence activities are directed by the Director of Intelligence and Research (Thomas L. Hughes), who is a member of USIB.

Federal Bureau of Investigation. The FBI has jurisdiction over investigation of violations of federal laws, including those dealing with espionage, sabotage, treason and other matters pertaining to internal security. Director: J. Edgar Hoover.

the request of U.S. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge. Richardson, according to Saigon reports, worked closely on operational matters with Diem's brother and close adviser, Ngo Dinh Nhu, who was killed Nov. 2 with Diem in the uprising. Lodge apparently complained that his own position as head of the American mission in Viet Nam was inconsistent with the operations of the CIA under Richardson.

Watchdog Proposals

Periodic efforts to create a watchdog group modelled on the Joint Atomic Energy Committee came to nought after the Senate voted down the proposal, 27-59 (D 19-21; R 8-38), on April 11, 1956. The proposal (S Con Res 2) had been introduced by Sen. Mike Mansfield (D Mont., now Senate Majority Leader) with 34 co-sponsors, 10 of whom voted against the measure when it came to the floor. Among those who voted with Mansfield for the proposal were Sens. J.W. Fulbright (D Ark., now Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee), John F. Kennedy (D Mass.), and Hubert H. Humphrey (D Minn., now Assistant Majority Leader).

The Eisenhower Administration opposed the resolution on grounds that CIA was "too sensitive" an agency to be submitted to such scrutiny. The ground was laid for the adverse vote on the resolution after the President Jan. 13, 1956 named eight private citizens to a Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities, acting on a recommendation of the second Hoover Commission in 1955. President Kennedy reconstituted the group as the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board in 1961 after the Bay of Pigs disaster (see box).

Here are some of the arguments on S Con Res 2, expressed during debate April 9-11, 1956:

MANSFIELD -- "Allen Dulles, Director of CIA, may make no mistakes in assessing intelligence, but he should not be the lone judge in matters which have to do with the intentions of other nations with respect to war and peace."

LEVERETT SALTONSTALL (R MASS.) -- "As a member of both (the Appropriations and Armed Services) Committees, I consider I have been informed of the activities of the CIA to the extent that...is wise.... At least twice a year (CIA briefs) the Armed Services Committee and at least once a year...the Appropriations Committee."

WAYNE MORSE (D ORE.) -- "No topic of government belonging to all the people...is too sensitive for the elected representatives of a free people to handle.... What the President needs is a refresher course on the constitutional system of our country."

RICHARD B. RUSSELL (D GA.) -- "It would be more desirable to abolish the CIA and close it up, lock, stock and barrel, than to adopt any such theory as that all the Members of Congress...are entitled to know the details of all the activities of this far-flung organization."

Current proposals are similar to Mansfield's 1956 resolution. The main arguments in favor of such proposals were contained in a House floor speech given by Rep. John V. Lindsay (see below).

Proposals in Congress

Current resolutions calling for a joint committee to oversee the intelligence community or a committee to investigate gathering of foreign information.

S J Res 61	McCarthy (D Minn.)	3/14/63
S Con Res 23	Smathers (D Fla.)	2/25/63
	Gruening (D Alaska)	2/25/63
S Res 213	McCarthy (D Minn.)	10/11/63
H J Res 145	Ryan (D N.Y.)	1/17/63
H J Res 211	Rogers (D Fla.)	1/29/63
H J Res 292	Gonzalez (D Texas)	2/27/63
H J Res 297	Gibbons (D Fla.)	3/ 4/63
H J Res 299	Harding (D Idaho)	3/ 4/63
H J Res 303	Udall (D Ariz.)	3/ 4/63
H J Res 304	Wright (D Texas)	3/ 4/63
H J Res 312	Kornegay (D N.C.)	3/ 7/63
H J Res 313	Montoya (D N.M.)	3/ 7/63
H J Res 317	Long (D Md.)	3/11/63
H J Res 653	Lindsay (R N.Y.)	8/15/63
H J Res 654	Morse (R Mass.)	8/15/63
H J Res 688	Anderson (R Ill.)	9/10/63
H J Res 730	King (R N.Y.)	9/12/63
H Con Res 2	Zablocki (D Wis.)	1/ 9/63
H Con Res 3	Kelly (D N.Y.)	1/ 9/63
H Con Res 12	Daddario (D Conn.)	1/ 9/63
H Con Res 60	King (R N.Y.)	1/28/63
H Con Res 82	Minshall (R Ohio)	2/ 5/63
H Con Res 217	Fulton (R Pa.)	10/ 8/63

Opposition to CIA Watchdog

Asked at his Oct. 9 press conference, following the recall of Richardson, how he felt about the proposal for a Congressional watchdog committee for CIA, President Kennedy replied:

"I think the present committees -- there's one in both the House and Senate which maintains very close liaison with the CIA -- is best, considering the sensitive nature of the Central Intelligence Agency's work.... They meet frequently with Mr. McCone and he also testifies before the Foreign Relations Committees of House and Senate and the general Armed Services Committees. And I think that the Congress has through that organization the means of keeping a liaison with him.

"In addition, I have an Advisory Council which was headed by Dr. Killian formerly, now Mr. Clark Clifford... I am well satisfied with the present arrangement."

Members of the Senate and House Armed Services subcommittees dealing with CIA matters have opposed the proposal on several grounds. (See excerpts of House debate below.) Sen. Saltonstall said, after the U-2 incident, that he did not want to investigate too intensely because "we might obtain information which I personally would rather not have." But their main argument is that the committees provide sufficient Congressional surveillance.

The 10-member House Armed Services CIA Subcommittee and the 6-member Senate Armed Services Central Intelligence Subcommittee each has only one Northern Democrat, the others being Southerners and Republicans. Watchdog proposals, however, have come

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from both parties and both North and South. Membership of the appropriate subcommittees follows:

Senate CIA Subcommittee

Richard B. Russell (D Ga.), Chairman
 Harry Flood Byrd (D Va.)
 Carl Hayden (D Ariz.)
 John Stennis (D Miss.)
 Leverett Saltonstall (R Mass.)
 Milton R. Young (R N.D.)

House CIA Subcommittee

Carl Vinson (D Ga.), Chairman
 L. Mendel Rivers (D S.C.)
 F. Edward Hebert (D La.)
 Melvin Price (D Ill.)
 Charles E. Bennett (D Fla.)
 George Huddleston Jr. (D Ala.)
 Leslie C. Arends (R Ill.)
 William G. Bray (R Ind.)
 Bob Wilson (R Calif.)
 Frank C. Osmers Jr. (R N.J.)

Lindsay Thesis

Rep. John V. Lindsay (R N.Y.) Aug. 15 presented the case for establishment of a Joint Committee on Foreign Information and Intelligence in a long floor speech when he introduced a resolution (H J Res 653) to create such a committee. He began by questioning the principal arguments against a watchdog committee:

Secrecy. No one denies, Lindsay said, that secrecy is the essence of the work of the CIA and allied agencies. "But does this mean that Congress is to have no effective authority in these areas? Of course it does not. Congress has always asserted its right to concern itself with even the most sensitive areas of Government. And, where matters of the highest secrecy have been involved," he said, "Members of both houses have shown themselves perfectly capable of exercising the utmost restraint."

Exclusively an Executive Agency. Lindsay attacked the idea "that the intelligence community exists solely to serve the President and the National Security Council, and that therefore we in the Congress have no right to seek a jurisdictional position." He said Executive and Legislative Branches cannot be kept so strictly separate, adding "there are any number of Congressional committees which keep a watch over the executive agencies." He cited the Foreign Affairs and the Government Operations Committees. He said "we have not only a right but a duty to maintain a general surveillance over agencies like the CIA."

Congressional Oversight Adequate. Lindsay said the House and Senate committees which already handle intelligence matters (see above) were "small subcommittees" which exercised surveillance which is "almost certainly both cursory and sporadic." He cited Sen. Saltonstall's remark that the Senate Armed Services Central Intelligence Subcommittee spent "several hours" on CIA operations, expenses and administration, holding this was insufficient. The reasons for the brevity of attention, he said, included the fact that the Congressional CIA subcommittees lacked "any staff specialized in these matters."

Information-Gathering Body. Lindsay disputed the claim that CIA was an information-gathering and not a policymaking body. He cited a passage from Prof. Harry Howe Ransom's authoritative study, "Central Intelligence and National Security," which said: "Certainly the CIA has no policymaking responsibility. Yet policy making is not a simple static action. Rather it is a dynamic process. A key element in this process is the information available to policymakers. The man, or group, controlling the information available to policymakers does in fact play a major if indirect role in policymaking."

Lindsay then went into his reasons for supporting a watchdog committee over intelligence matters:

Investigation of Blunders. He said that, while the intelligence community certainly had its "quite spectacular successes," it "has blundered seriously, and that for its blunder the citizens of the United States have paid a heavy price." He added, "surely most Members of the House will agree that it would be in the national interest to know whether such incidents were merely particular aberrations or whether, in fact, they form a pattern that is likely to be repeated in the future."

Danger of Secrecy. While, he said, "I fully realize... that a high degree of secrecy is essential to the workings of the intelligence community... I fear that with respect to the... community we are often the victims of secrecy for secrecy's sake. Things are done to us and in our name which we know nothing of. I do not wish to see the legitimate secrets of the intelligence community reported in the press and on the air.... But it does seem to me of enormous importance that a few selected representatives of the people, chosen by the two houses of Congress, should be continuously aware of what the intelligence community is doing and of the way in which it is going about doing it. The American people have at stake, not merely their liberties, but their lives."

As for what the proposed committee should do, Lindsay cited four areas "which might usefully be investigated":

CIA-State Department Relations. Lindsay said there was often a danger that the U.S. ambassador in a foreign country -- the head of mission -- might be frustrated by uncoordinated and secret operations of U.S. intelligence agents in the same community. (This was the situation which actually occurred in the case of Ambassador Lodge and CIA chief Richardson in Viet Nam. See above)

Research v. Special Operations. Lindsay said there was a potential conflict between intelligence-gathering functions of the CIA and special operations, such as para-military adventures, "that is, the fomenting of opposition against hostile governments, the arming of insurgents, the provocation of enemy action, and so on. The question of housing these special operations... under the same roof as the CIA's purely intelligence-gathering operations has, of course, long been a matter of controversy, and it is this question that I suggest might usefully be (studied)."

Selection and Training of Personnel. Lindsay advocated that such a committee study "the whole question of recruitment and personnel within the intelligence community. For it seems to me perfectly clear that one of the things that went wrong with the abortive Cuban invasion -- not the only thing, but one of the things -- was that much of the CIA personnel responsible for the operation consisted of the sort of people who could not

distinguish between the reactionary and the democratic elements in the anti-Castro camp, between the opponents of Castro who were acceptable to the Cuban people and those who, as former supporters of Batista, were anathema to them." "All I am saying," he added, "is that I have a hunch that CIA recruitment policy has had an effect on CIA's performance. I may be wrong, but I submit that the only way we in Congress can find out is by ourselves conducting an inquiry into the subject."

Evaluation. Lindsay said the proposed committee should look into "the question of how best to organize the evaluation of the enormous amount of material collected every day by the various agencies of the intelligence community.... I am particularly concerned with the top-level U.S. Intelligence Board and its auxiliary bodies." Lindsay complained about the "central role" of the CIA on the USIB and elsewhere in the evaluation

process, and the "duality of the CIA's role. Under the National Security Act the Agency is not only one of the participants in the intelligence community, it is also the chief agency responsible for coordinating it. In other words, at many points in the process of evaluation, CIA is both player and umpire, both witness and judge.... Now the danger here is clear. It is that the (CIA) will become -- perhaps it has already become -- not merely the chief intelligence agency but the dominant intelligence agency, and that it will develop persistent institutional tendencies, biases, and even policies....

"It is obvious that the problem of evaluation is an enormously important problem, probably the most important confronting the intelligence community. For these reasons, I think that it, too, should be a continuing subject of scrutiny by a well-qualified and well-staffed committee of Congress."

House Debate Brings Out Arguments For and Against CIA Watchdog

The arguments for and against establishment of a joint Congressional committee, similar to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, to oversee U.S. foreign intelligence activities were brought out during House debate Oct. 30 on a bill (HR 8427) to establish a special CIA retirement and disability system for a limited number of the agency's employees (about 30 percent). Excerpts of the debate follow:

REP. H. R. GROSS (R-IOWA). Is the CIA subject to jurisdiction of the Secretary of Defense?

REP. KATHARINE ST. GEORGE (R-N.Y.). No one seems to know to whom they are subject, I may say to the gentleman. One cannot find out how many people are employed in the Agency and one cannot find out exactly what their duties are. We heard varying figures. It is a very hush-hush, secret organization.

As long as the gentleman brings the subject up, I think we might also say that Americans are not very accustomed to dealing with cloak-and-dagger organizations. This is one, perhaps, that we are not too well fitted to discuss.

GROSS. I am sure we all had difficulty finding out what part the CIA played in the Bay of Pigs fiasco.

ST. GEORGE. I agree with the gentleman. It is very difficult to find these things out but, perhaps, that has to be so in an organization of this kind.

REP. WILLIAM FITTS RYAN (D-N.Y.). I am interested in the remarks of the gentleman concerning the CIA and the cloak of secrecy surrounding it. I am reminded that there are a number of bills pending in the Congress. I am the author of one... which would establish a special watchdog committee over the CIA. Certainly recent events in South Viet Nam confirm the need for a Joint Committee on Foreign Information and Intelligence to oversee the CIA. I hope the Rules Committee will report out one of these bills with as much expedition as this bill has been reported out.

ST. GEORGE. I am a very humble member of the Rules Committee, so I can do very little in assisting the gentleman in his desires.

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REP. H. ALLEN SMITH (R-CALIF.). Mr. Speaker, I am not refusing to support this measure because I do not believe that the employees are entitled to it. My refusal is because I just do not know whether or not they are entitled to it. I know so little about the CIA and their activities, that I do not wish to pass further legislation which will further increase my lack of knowledge. It seems to me that Congress not only has the right, but that it has the responsibility to know more about the CIA.

I understand that senior members of the House and Senate committees meet from time to time with the CIA Director and that in 1956 a President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities was established. But even so, I do not know how thoroughly they check the activities of the CIA.... I do have some questions in my mind that I believe should be answered. And I believe they can be answered without interfering with their activities. How many employees are there in the CIA? -- 1,000, 5,000, 10,000, 15,000 or more? I am inclined to feel that there are probably more than 15,000 but have nothing factually to so state.

How many employees are there in London?.... If there are 200 employees in London, which I have heard, but cannot state as a fact, what are they doing? I think we are entitled to know something about this, Mr. Speaker.

Testimony before Rules indicated that this measure would apply to about 30 percent of the employees. I ask 30 percent of how many? I also think we are entitled to know something about what their activities were prior to the Bay of Pigs in Cuba. I have heard rumors that their information was incorrect and that the CIA was greatly responsible for this horrible event. Should Members of Congress not be entitled to know of these activities and to in some way have at least a little control over the CIA? Very frankly, Mr. Speaker, I anticipate that Khrushchev and even the Russian Embassy here in Washington know more about CIA than I do. Why is it so confidential that the Members of Congress do not know the annual cost of the CIA? It would not surprise me if it were more than a billion dollars annually.

I have great confidence in the Members of Congress. Certainly no Member would think of doing anything to harm our security. So it seems to me that we should have some select committee, or a watchdog committee, or some small group that could honestly and fairly check upon and with the CIA so that the rest of the Members would have some idea as to what is going on, whether we are doing our job so far as the CIA is concerned, and whether or not legislation such as the pending bill is warranted.... I just cannot support legislation to further compound the mystery....

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REP. L. MENDEL RIVERS (D-S.C.), floor manager of the bill. As a member of the CIA Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, I had previously learned a great deal about the activities of the Agency and the sacrifices called for on the part of the employees. During the course of the four days extensive hearings on HR 8427 before the House Armed Services Committee, Agency witnesses were candid and fully cooperative in presenting their need for this improved retirement system. For reasons of security I am unable to present the specific situations which demonstrate the need for this new system.

As a member of the CIA Subcommittee... I believe I am also in a position to make a judgment on the Agency. In my opinion, I believe the Agency is doing a brilliant job under most trying circumstances.

For those who contend that the Congress fails to exercise supervision over CIA, I would like to state the facts. The Armed Services Committee has legislative jurisdiction over CIA and, for many years, the gentleman from Georgia (Chairman Carl Vinson, D-Ga.) has appointed a Subcommittee whose sole function is to review Agency activities.... As a matter of policy, the Subcommittee has endeavored to meet with the Director and other Agency officials at least once a month to conduct an examination of its activities on a world wide basis. In the course of these hearings we receive substantive intelligence briefings to keep us up to date on happenings throughout the world. It is the purpose of the Subcommittee to fully inform itself on all aspects of Agency operations and personnel practices. The Director of Central Intelligence

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has explored with the Subcommittee the most sensitive of Agency operations in order that the members be fully informed.

At times I, as a member, am concerned with the sensitivity of this information and its serious nature for fear that it might inadvertently endanger someone's life or a highly successful operation....

As to the CIA conducting independent operation in pursuance of its own policy, the Subcommittee has examined very closely the machinery by which the Agency is in fact responsible to the policy-makers. Under the existing procedural machinery, the Agency simply cannot operate independently nor does it in fact operate as a policymaking organ of the Government. The Director is directly responsible to the President....

REP. CHET HOLIFIELD (D CALIF.). I am glad the gentleman brought this point out because, as a member of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, we have had close relationships with the CIA. We know what the gentleman from South Carolina says is true, that there are people who have served in this organization who are in jail and some have lost their lives. Furthermore, they are also in a situation where they cannot be protected or they cannot be claimed as a member of the CIA in the event they are captured and jailed in a foreign country.

RIVERS. If I should tell you how many of these agents we have or if I should give you some sort of a number of the agents that we have, the Soviets could merely by a matter of arithmetic figure them out and ferret them out.

For instance, when the Director decides to separate a man he cannot go into court with his case under this bill, because if he did, any espionage person could figure out exactly who these people are, how many they are, and what they do. We cannot permit this. This espionage business is a dangerous business; it is not one that I would be in. We have never been in it before.... We must have this agency and we must give them this benefit.

REP. PAUL C. JONES (D MO.). I appreciate the fact that this whole Agency has to operate under an aura of secrecy.

RIVERS. Why, certainly.

JONES. And sometimes they are inclined to carry it to the ridiculous.... At the time of the U-2 incident...I made an appointment with Mr. (Allen) Dulles (former CIA Director) to talk to him about this thing. He tried to explain it to me, but I did not get much information. In his old headquarters they had a picture of the new CIA building. Just out of idle curiosity more than anything else, I said, "Mr. Dulles, how many people will be employed in this new building?" He said, "Oh, we cannot tell you that. That is secret." To me that was an asinine reply to a question, because I think anyone knows that there was no secrecy with regard to the number of people to be employed in that new building out at the Central Intelligence Agency, because anybody who knows anything about trying to estimate the number of employees in a building could have gotten it very well; or for that matter one could count the employees entering and leaving by public highway.

The thing that disturbs me about this bill is the fact that it has been the practice throughout many years for these people to take advantage of their sensitive position and to use it for privileged treatment which is not justified....

I do not think you have given us enough information about these people at the lower levels (CIA employees), who constitute a great majority. I would want some assurance that those people are not going to get further preferred treatment under this bill. I would like to have the gentleman comment on that.

RIVERS. The gentleman has made a pretty good speech. I do not know where to start to answer his question. I allowed him to talk for five minutes. What question does he want me to answer?

JONES. I asked the gentleman first if he knew of the differential in salary between the people employed doing clerical, filing, and typing work, who were getting paid more than those people in the departments?

RIVERS. I do not know that.

JONES. I think the gentleman should know it. I think his committee should know it. I think the House is entitled to that information.

RIVERS. The bill clearly points out who would be covered.

JONES. I respectfully point out that it does not.

RIVERS. I must be stupid, because I have tried to explain that to the gentleman.

JONES. I do not think the gentleman is stupid. I think sometimes that Committee is overawed by the great secrecy under which

this Agency operates and some of the people have taken advantage of their position to keep secret some things that the Congress and the gentleman's Committee particularly are entitled to know.

REP. CLARK MACGREGOR (R MINN.). I was particularly pleased by the comments of the gentleman from South Carolina (Rivers) with respect to the nature of his Committee's knowledge of the work of the (CIA). This is particularly so because from time to time over the past three years we have heard complaints in this body and in the other body about the need for the establishment of a watchdog committee which, in my opinion, is not indicated from my knowledge of the existing committees of the Congress....

I should like to ask the gentleman...whether he agrees that the Committee on which the gentleman serves and other committees mentioned by the President (Kennedy) do maintain effective liaison over the work of the Central Intelligence Agency?

RIVERS. We do it all the time. The gentleman from Georgia (Vinson) is chairman of that subcommittee and its members meet all the time. We get all the information they have. We get a briefing on the world situation. They are totally frank. They present some very, very brilliant information before our subcommittee. They know how to figure out intelligence. It is quite an impressive thing.

JONES. I want to know if the gentleman thinks that this was justified as a matter of secrecy as to the number of employees that are working in this CIA building here in Washington?

RIVERS. I think so.

REP. CHARLES E. BENNETT (D FLA.). ...I would like to say there have been from time to time in the press and among individual Members of the House and others comments with regard to the necessity or the validity of adding another CIA committee. I think this is primarily because most Members of the Congress, or at least most members of the press and the public generally do not realize there are committees of this type in the House and Senate at the present time. So I would think, if questions are in the minds of Members of Congress, it might be an appropriate thing for these Members of Congress to treat the Committee on Armed Services and its CIA subcommittee just as they treat every other committee of the Congress and address to them the questions they have with regard to employment policies and with regard to any other policies they may have, and in this way perhaps some of this unnecessary secrecy can be removed. There is a degree of secrecy necessary in the CIA, but there is also a large area where there is no real necessity for secrecy.

REP. LESLIE C. ARENDS (R ILL.). Mr. Chairman, our Committee on Armed Services has had a Subcommittee on the (CIA) for many years. As a member of that subcommittee since its inception I have become somewhat familiar with the nature of the Agency's organization and its manifold activities. Our subcommittee has regularly inquired into the CIA's operation and from time to time have made specific inquiry into some specific aspect of its activities. Whenever a question would arise as to what the CIA had been doing in some particular area, our subcommittee would quietly but thoroughly look into it.

Naturally, all our subcommittee inquiries, investigations, and briefings were in executive session. Naturally, no reports have been issued as to our findings and recommendations. To do so would destroy the effectiveness of the Agency, and the importance of this Agency's work to our country's security cannot be too strongly emphasized....

For my part, I believe that in the CIA we have one of the finest intelligence agencies in the world....

There is one thing more I should like to emphasize with respect to the CIA. Contrary to what we read and hear from time to time, the CIA does not pursue an independent foreign policy. The Agency does not make policy. It simply gathers the facts upon which policy may be based. It simply carries out orders dictated by those who make policy.

GROSS. Mr. Chairman, if I may have the attention of the gentleman from Illinois (Arends), I would like to compliment the House Armed Services Committee on being able to get any and every type of information which they wanted from the Central Intelligence Agency. That has not been the experience of some other committees of Congress.

Mr. Chairman, I would have appreciated it had the gentleman went on today and told us who in the Cuban Bay of Pigs fiasco fell flat on their collective or individual faces.